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Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in
America
Sheila Jasanoff
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, 285 pp.

Reviewed by Heather C. Devinet

Science, scientists, and Scientism pervade North American
courtrooms in a confluence of biases and misperceptions. From the
specific role of science in the courtroom to the broader issue of
science within the legal system, these concepts have wielded
unfettered influence and caused many negative repercussions.
Beneficial and clinically safe anti-nausea drugs such as Benedictin
have been declared terratogens and rendered unavailable without
replacement; pseudo-scientific methodologies such as hypnosis have
been used to "improve" the faulty memories of witnesses; and
complex statistical analyses have been creatively "re-analyzed" to
"prove" causation in toxic tort suits.
In light of the tremendous influence of science within the law
and the serious repercussions of its misuse, Sheila Jasanoff takes this
opportunity to carefully detail these issues. While her analysis is
detailed, it is also sufficiently broad to provide the reader with a
comprehensive understanding. Her analysis encompasses such
diverse concepts as the envelopment of novel (and mostly
unaccepted) scientific evidence into legal precedence to "the
relationship between the judiciary' s analysis of science and the,
overall clarity and consistency of judicial rule-making." 1
The author begins, in Chapter One, with a discussion of "The
Intersections of Science and Law" where a contrast and comparison
of the two disciplines provides the reader with an understanding of

t B.A. (Hons.) (Carleton), M.J. (Carleton), LLB. anticipated 1997 (Queen's).
1 S. Jasanoff, Science At The Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) at 21.
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why scientists and lawyers often appear to be working in binary
opposition. While they appear to be opposed, she writes, the
cultures of law are, in fact, "mutually constitutive in ways that have
previously escaped systematic analysis." 2 The best approach to
understanding this complex relationship, she argues, is to
understand "how these institutions jointly produce our social and
scientific knowledge."3
This approach is indispensable to any effective attempt at
reform and its underlying principle is that "the law today not only
interprets the social impacts of science and technology but also
constructs the very environment in which science and technology
come to have meaning, utility, and force." 4 It is here, within the
underlying principle, that we see Jasanoff s unique approach to a
problem which has affected both disciplines since the seventeenth
century. She applies a critical approach to science and unravels both
the interpretation of science within the legal system and how that
interpretation affects which aspects of science come to have
influence and meaning. She relates her findings within the legal
system and American society in general.
Her approach is reflected in the structure of the text. She
focuses much of her attention on what is described as "the law's
construction of expertise." 5 She discusses how legal morals, ethics,
and culture interweave to determine the substantive, procedural and
stylistic aspects of science which have influence within the
courtroom and, consequently, legal precedence. For example, the
section on "Cultures of Expert Witnessing" 6 illustrates how expert
witnesses and their roles within a trial have become a commodity
where "persuasiveness more than raw scientific credentials
determines a witness's worth." 7
I believe that the repercussions of her findings are tremendous.
If scientific evidence is assigned legal value based on the ability of
the expert witness to persuade, rather than on the scientific validity
of the evidence itself, then what value should scientific evidence

Supra note I at 8.
Ibid. at 8.
4 Ibid. at 16.
5 Ibid. at 42-68.
6 Ibid. at 45-52.
7 Ibid. at 46.
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actually be assigned? If it is evaluated with the same scrutiny, on the
same terms as other evidence generally, should scientific evidence
be differentiated at all? Perhaps not, one might conclude. However,
it is undeniable that scientific evidence is generally accorded more
significance and more validity by triers of fact. Therefore, although
it is not subjected to additional or evaluative scrutiny, one is left
with evidence that is generally accorded higher significance and
validity and is differentiated from general evidence on the basis of
its association with the constructs embodied in the scientific
method. One must conclude that the result of this process is
evidence that is considered to be more reliable even though the very
aspect which makes it reliable is never evaluated. I agree with
J asanoff s call for reform in which she argues that inherent biases
and misperceptions within the legal system must be overcome. The
alternative is to relegate scientific evidence to commonality, on par
with other kinds of evidence.
The examination of science, scientific evidence, and toxic torts
is also well researched and well argued. Jasanoff points to several
areas where the legal interpretation of scientific evidence has skewed
evidence to suit a variety of legal purposes. For example, the issue
of junk science in the court room, where scientists reinterpret data
to suit their hypotheses, and the courts' continual demonstration of
a fundamental lack of understanding of causative analyses provide
additional support for her call for reform. Finally, she provides an
elaborate discussion on the relationship of science to the state with
regard to policy making, budget expenditures, and the technical
discourse of government.
The timeliness and relevance of this publication for a Canadian
reader outweigh its purely American focus. Canadian lower courts
continue to struggle to find adequate tests to control the admission
of novel scientific evidence, such as evidence of DNA and statistical
probability analyses. Jasanoff s discussion of causative factors and
demand for reform provides a general overview, albeit from an
advanced perspective, of a legal system struggling with important
issues; issues that are also affecting Canada's legal system. An
indication of the advanced perspective present in the United States
regarding science and the law can be found in the recent United
States Supreme Court announcement of new criteria by which
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judges ought to distinguish between valid and invalid evidence. 8
Contrast this to the Supreme Court of Canada's latest relevant
decision9 where it applied a test that has barely changed in seventy
years (pre-dating even the invention of antibiotics). It is very
apparent that this publication has much to offer critics of the role
and treatment of science within Canada's legal system; a legal
system on the cusp of change.
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